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Existing registry technologies such as UDDI can be enhanced to support capabilities for semantic 
reasoning and inquiry, which subsequently increases its usability range. The Grimoires registry was 
developed to provide such support through the use of metadata attachments to registry entities.  The 
use of such attachments provides a way for allowing service operators to specify security assertions 
pertaining to registry entities owned by them. These assertions may however have to be reconciled 
with existing registry policies. A security architecture based on the XACML standard and deployed 
in the OMII framework is outlined to demonstrate how this goal is achieved in the registry. 
1.   Introduction 
Registries are important in a large scale, 
distributed environment (such as the Grid) as 
they provide the necessary functionality that 
allows service providers to expose information 
about their services to potential users. Existing 
service registry technologies such as UDDI are 
however limited by  several shortcomings with 
regards to the service descriptions they support, 
generally pertaining to the constraints in the 
information model for these service 
descriptions. Such constraints make it difficult 
to satisfy sophisticated user requirements for 
service discovery based on service 
characteristics inexpressible in the UDDI 
model, or for useful semantic reasoning on these 
descriptions. The Grimoires registry, which was 
designed and developed in the context of the 
myGrid project [6] and is now part of the OMII 
project [3], seeks to provide a solution to these 
issues through the use of metadata attachments.  
 
As is the case for all Grid-based services, some 
form of security architecture is needed to 
protect the contents of the registry. In this paper, 
we describe the use of metadata for semantic 
descriptions and their requirements for security. 
We then discuss the potential use of metadata 
attachments as a way of enhancing the 
flexibility of expressing access control to the 
registry contents.  
2.   Using metadata for registry 
publications 
Metadata are extra pieces of data giving 
information about existing entities in the 
registry. Currently, entities to which metadata 
can be attached are UDDI BusinessEntity, 
BusinessService, tModel and BindingTemplate  
and WSDL operation and message part. For 
example, BusinessEntities can be annotated 
with appropriate ratings; functionality profiles 
can be added to BusinessServices; and semantic 
types of operation arguments can be attached to 
WSDL message parts. A piece of metadata is in 
the form of an RDF [9] triple — the subject is 
the entity to be annotated, the predicate is the 
type of the annotation, and the object is the 
value. The metadata value can be a string, a 
URI, or structured data in RDF. A unique key is 
assigned to every piece of metadata published 
allowing metadata attachments to be updated 
without republishing the service. This presents 
an efficient way of capturing ephemeral 
information about services that change often, 
such as current load of a service.  
 
There is no limit to the number of attachments 
each entity can have. Since each piece of 
metadata has its own unique key, it can be 
updated without republishing other metadata 
attached to the same entity. Support is provided 
for third party annotations, i.e. the ability to 
publish metadata is available to both service 
operators and third parties. This provides the 
flexibility of allowing users with expert 
knowledge to enrich service descriptions in 
ways that might not be conceivable to the 
original publishers. For instance, users can 
provide their personal ratings on services.  
 
Multiple search patterns are also supported in 
Grimoires. The simplest form of query returns a 
list of all metadata attached to the specified 
entity. A more complex search pattern is 
supported using the operation find 
entityByMetadata, which takes a sequence of 
metadata (type, value) pairs or an RDQL statement. The operation returns a list of entities 
annotated by metadata matching the query. 
Search patterns such as this can also be 
combined with standard UDDI-type queries.  
 
3.   Authentication in Grimoires 
Security for a registry in a distributed 
environment is generally concerned with 
establishing identity (or role, for a role-based 
system) correctly in the authentication process 
and using that identity/role to determine access 
control decisions to the registry contents. In 
UDDIv2 and v3, an arbitrary XML element 
termed an authentication token is transmitted by 
a user by embedding it within publisher API 
calls.  This token is intended for use by the 
registry in an access control decision.  It is 
generated by the registry and transmitted to a 
user when the user successfully authenticates to 
the registry. In implementations such as jUDDI 
[4], this initial authentication process is 
achieved using a username/password 
combination sent via the get_authToken 
message. The username/password will map to 
an internal identity known to the registry in a 
successful authentication, and a suitable 
authentication token can then be returned to the 
original user.  
 
This username/password authentication 
approach however does not scale well for most 
Grid environments, which generally require that 
identities be determined in a more globally 
consistent manner.  This is typically achieved 
utilizing certificate-based authentication 
schemes such as that found in the Globus 
Security Infrastructure [1] or OMII [3].  
 
Grimoires is currently deployed within the 
OMII framework [3] as a Web Service, using 
Apache Axis and Tomcat as the foundational 
deploying environment. The OMII framework 
provides an implementation of applying digital 
signatures to SOAP messages and verifying 
these signatures in accordance with WS-
Security standards [2]. The framework can 
extract the Distinguished Name (DN) from the 
submitted X509 client certificate in an incoming 
SOAP call, which can be subsequently used by 
the registry in the appropriate access control. 
This negates the need for additional 
functionality in the registry to generate a new 
authentication token to be returned to the user, 
as well as the need at the user end to embed this 
token in all subsequent publisher  API calls.  
4.   Enhancing access control 
assertions 
The access control component of a security 
architecture for a data store can be policy-
driven. Such a policy would typically contain 
assertions, which describe certain restrictions on 
granting request to data resources. In many 
database implementations, these assertions 
assume the form of  mappings between 
identities and  corresponding privileged 
operations (such as creating, deleting, etc) that 
can be performed on specific portions  of a 
database.  
 
For the case of a UDDI registry implementation, 
there are two major sets of operations that are 
offered to potential clients: the inquiry and the 
publication API. In the simplest case, 
implementing access control functionality 
would involve dividing the potential pool of 
known clients (i.e. clients that are able of 
authenticating successfully to the registry in 
question) into groups which are permitted to 
perform operations from either one or both of 
the two  main API sets. This can map in a 
straight forward manner to the RBAC 
mechanisms (with the groups corresponding to 
roles) offered by many database systems. 
 
There is however likely to be a need to further 
refine such access control assertions. For 
example, it might be desirable in some UDDI 
applications to restrict the ability to modify or 
delete a registry entry to only the user who 
published that entry in the first instance.  In the 
case of Grimoires, the use of third party 
annotations would also in addition introduce the 
requirement that a service operator be able to 
specify the third parties that are permitted to 
publish metadata relating to the original entry of 
the service operator.  In both cases above, 
restricting access solely on the basis of 
operations is insufficient; the notion of identities 
must be incorporated to some extent in the 
access control assertions. In addition, from an 
efficiency consideration, these access control 
assertions should be articulated directly on 
registry entity without the need for an additional 
communication between the service publisher 
and the registry access control security policy 
enforcer. This enhanced ability for the service 
publisher to make its own assertions may 
however in some circumstances need to be 
balanced against the security policies operating 
on the registry.  
 We describe a simple motivating scenario to 
illustrate these issues as a context for this paper.  
Consider service operators that offer a variety of  
tools and services; such parties  may welcome 
metadata attachments to their registry entries 
from users  in order to enhance the visibility and 
reputation of their tools. Towards this end, 
operators would seek to ensure that the users 
desiring to annotate their service descriptions 
are sufficiently qualified within a given context 
to do so. On the other hand, operators could 
contrive so that only users partial to their 
services are ever allowed to provide 
annotations.  If it is in the interests of the system 
to support a balanced third party view of any 
particular service description, then the overall 
registry security policy can be modified to 
reflect this. For example, the policy could 
specify that a specific group of users will 
always be allowed or denied annotation 
capabilities, regardless of any forthcoming 
access control assertions from a given service 
operator.  
 
From this sample scenario, we can ascertain two 
primary requirements: 1) a means for service 
publishers to include access control assertions 
relating to their entries, and 2) a way to 
reconcile these assertions and those from the 
registry security policy in a consistent way so 
that potential conflicts do not affect the overall 
access control functionality offered. The first 
requirement can be satisfied in Grimoires by 
specifying an access control assertion in a 
suitable format as a metadata attachment to a 
registry entity.  For example, the identity of the 
third parties permitted to further annotate a 
service description could be specified in the 
metadata at the point when the entity is 
published to the registry. 
For the second requirement, we have chosen the 
XACML [7] framework that supports a 
standardized method of expressing access 
control assertions as well combining these 
assertions from differing policies. XACML is   
an XML-based language for access control 
policies as well as a request/response language 
for expressing queries based on those policies. 
We briefly describe XACML in general and 
XACML policies specifically in the next 
sections and then detail how they are used for 
access control in Grimoires. 
5.   XACML 
The policy language in XACML is used to 
describe general access control requirements, 
and has standard extension points for defining 
new functions, data types, combining logic, etc. 
The request/response language allows the 
formation of a query to ask whether or not a 
given action should be allowed, and interpret 
the result.  
The typical setup involves an individual 
requiring some action on a resource. A request 
is made to whatever actually protects that 
resource (like a filesystem or a web server), 
which is called a Policy Enforcement Point 
(PEP). The PEP forms a request based on the 
requester's attributes (such as the requester’s 
identity, assigned group, etc), the resource in 
question, the action, and other information 
pertaining to the request. The PEP then sends 
this request to a Policy Decision Point (PDP), 
which looks at the request, finds some policy 
that applies to the request, and applies it 
accordingly. The evaluation result is returned to 
the PEP, which can then allow or deny access to 
the requester.  
6.   XACML policies 
A policy is a combination of several 
subcomponents: target, rules, rule-combining 
algorithm, and obligations. The functionality of 
these subcomponents are as follows: 
 
Target. Each policy has only one target, which 
determines whether the policy is relevant for the 
request. This is achieved by defining attributes 
of three categories in the target: subject, 
resource, and action, along with their values. 
The values of these attributes are compared with 
the values of the same attributes in the request; 
if they match according to some specified 
function, then the policy is considered relevant 
to the request and is evaluated.  
 
Rules. Multiple rules can be associated to a 
policy. Each rule is composed of a condition, an 
effect, and a target. Conditions are statements 
about attributes that upon evaluation return 
either True, False, or Indeterminate. Effect is 
the intended consequence of the satisfied rule. It 
can either take the value Permit or Deny.   
Target, as in the case of a policy, helps in 
determining whether or not a rule is relevant for 
a request. The mechanism for achieving this is 
also similar to how it is done in the case of a 
target for a policy. The final outcome of the rule 
depends on the condition evaluation.  
 
Rule-combining algorithm: A policy can have 
multiple rules. It is possible for different rules to generate conflicting results. Rule-combining 
algorithms are responsible for resolving such 
conflicts to arrive at one outcome per policy per 
request. XACML defines the following rule-
combining algorithms (permitting for user-
defined combinations as well): 
•  Deny-overrides: If any rule evaluates 
to Deny, then the final authorization 
decision is also Deny. 
•  Ordered-deny-overrides: Same as 
deny-overrides, except the order in 
which relevant rules are evaluated is 
the same as the order in which they are 
added in the policy. 
•  Permit-overrides: If any rule evaluates 
to Permit, then the final authorization 
decision is also Permit. 
•  Ordered-permit-overrides: Same as 
permit-overrides, except the order in 
which relevant rules are evaluated is 
the same as the order in which they are 
added in the policy. 
•  First-applicable: The result of the first 
relevant rule encountered is the final 
authorization decision as well. 
  
With reference to the example scenario that we 
introduced in Section 4, a situation might arise 
where  the registry operator may desire to 
ensure that users from a specific organization 
are always banned from making third party 
annotations, regardless of any assertions from 
the individual service publishers. Here, the 
primary policy to be evaluated will initially 
contain the rule that expresses the desired 
constraint on the specific users.  Subsequent 
rules appended to the policy will be derived 
from the security assertions provided by service 
publishers. By specifying the ordered-deny-
overrides mode of rule combining, the 
evaluation of the policy will always ensure that 
the designated users will always be banned 
regardless of any assertions made by the service 
operators.  
 
7.   XACML access control in 
Grimoires 
 
We utilize the example that we had described in 
Section 4 to demonstrate a simple example of 
XACML based access control in Grimoires. 
This example is detailed in relation to the 







Fig 1. Grimoires security infrastructure. 
 
We consider a simple scenario where all 
authenticated individuals known to the registry 
are divided into several groups or roles; each 
role being permitted a specific set of registry 
operations on metadata attachments and registry 
entries. This is expressed in XACML as a 
registry wide policy that applies to all incoming 
requests. Assume a user attempts to publish a 
new businessService entity to the registry 
through a save_service API call. In the OMII 
framework, the outgoing UDDI SOAP message 
contents are signed with the user’s private key 
utilizing the OMII client side libraries, and 
appended to the SOAP message in accordance 
with WS-Security standards. At the container 
end, the signature is verified and the X500DN is 
extracted and passed over to the pre-processor, 
which is implemented as an Axis handler.  
 
The pre-processor then determines validity of 
the X500DN identity within the context of the 
registry security domain, maps the X500DN to 
an assigned role and formulates an appropriate 
XACML request from the SOAP message. It 
effectively implements the PEP functionality 
within the XACML architecture configuration. 
The XACML request, along with the original 
message contents, are passed onwards to the 
access control engine. This engine provides the 
PDP functionality of evaluating the 
permissibility of the request. If the assigned role 
is permitted the requested save_service 
operation, a check is first made to ensure that no 
entities with the same key already exist in the 
registry. Once this is achieved, a 
businessService entity is created in the RDF 
backend store and a corresponding key is 
returned to the invoking user.  At the same time, 
a new default metadata attachment for this 
entity is created consisting of a single XACML 
rule fragment that specifies that all future 
publish and metadata API operations on this 
entity is confined only to the requests 
originating from the X500DN of this entity.  
 Consider now a second user (with a different 
X500DN) that wishes to annotate this newly 
published entity via a metadata attachment. The 
incoming request from this user is processed in 
the same manner as previously up until the point 
when the access control engine ascertains that 
the entity already exists. In this case, it retrieves 
all related metadata attachments for the entity 
consisting of XACML fragments (one at this 
period of time) and accumulates them into a 
single policy. The request then is evaluated by 
combining the original registry wide policy with 
this dynamically constructed policy. Here, the 
requested operation will be denied  as the newly 
constructed policy restricts all metadata 
operations to the original publisher. This 
original publisher could broaden the access 
rights by simply publishing further XACML 
rule fragments which specify different groups or 
users permitted to perform specific metadata, 
publish or inquiry operations. In a situation like 
this where there are multiple rules to be 
evaluated in combination, the publisher could 
also specify the actual XACML rule combining 
algorithm to be used as a separate metadata 
attachment.  
 
To ensure consistency in combining the registry 
policy and the constructed policy, the registry 
administrator can seek to impose an appropriate 
policy combining algorithm. For example, 
setting the PolicyCombiningAlgId to Ordered-
Deny-Overrides and evaluating the registry 
policy first in this combination mode, ensures 
that any restrictions expressed there always 
takes precedence regardless of any other 
assertions in the dynamically constructed 
policy. Thus, if a metadata XACML rule 
fragment asserts that a certain user is permitted 
to perform a specific metadata operation but the 
operation is forbidden to the group that the user 
is classified in, then a request from that user for 
this operation will be denied. The registry 
policy and the combination rule is published as 
a separate entity description in the registry that 
is accessible to all potential users, who can 
decide accordingly on how to make appropriate 
security assertions in order to provide the 
desired level of access control on entities owned 
by them.   
 
<Subjects> 
  <Subject> 
   <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
     <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">GoodGroup</AttributeValue> 
     <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:attribute:role" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
   </SubjectMatch> 




  <Action> 
    <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">addMetadataToEntity</AttributeValue> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"                                          
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
    </ActionMatch> 
  </Action> 
  <Action> 
    <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
      <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">deleteMetadata</AttributeValue> 
      <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"                                          
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
    </ActionMatch> 
  </Action> 
</Actions>  
 
Fig. 2 Initial registry policy 
 
An example of a rule in a system wide policy is 
shown in Fig. 2. Here a XACML request 
pertaining to the GoodGroup role is permitted to 
perform addMetadataToEntity and 
deleteMetadata operations. The policy may 
alternatively contain a list of other rules as well 
that articulate further restrictions on specific 
types of operations permissible to registry 
entries. An example of a XACML rule fragment 
is shown in Fig. 3. Here, a specific X500 CN 
identity is permitted to perform the operation of addMetadataToEntity. The entire fragment is 
expressed as the object value of the RDF triple 
that constitutes a single metadata attachment. 
 
An example of XACML request requesting the 
attachment of a metadata entry to a service 
entity with the key value of 12345 is shown in 
Fig. 4. This request is created from the UDDI 
message contents by the pre-processor. 
<Rule RuleId="PermitRule" Effect="Permit"> 
  <Target> 
    <Subjects> 
      <Subject> 
        <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:rfc822Name-match"> 
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">CN=Bart 
Simpson</AttributeValue> 
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" 
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/> 
        </SubjectMatch> 
      </Subject> 
    </Subjects> 
 
   <Actions> 
     <Action> 
       <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
         <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">addMetadataToEntity</AttributeValue> 
         <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"                                          
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
       </ActionMatch> 
     </Action> 
   </Actions> 
  </Target> 
</Rule> 
     
      
     
Fig. 3 XACML rule fragments as metadata attachments 
 
 
8.   Conclusion  
In this paper, we briefly describe the features of 
the Grimoires registry which include support for 
<Request> 
  <Subject> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" DataType="xs:string" Issuer="registry.com"> 
      <AttributeValue>CN=John Doe</AttributeValue> 
    </Attribute> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:name-format" DataType="xs:anyURI"> 
      <AttributeValue>urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:datatype:x500name</AttributeValue> 
    </Attribute> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:attribute:role" DataType="xs:string" Issuer="registry.com"> 
      <AttributeValue>GoodGroup</AttributeValue> 
    </Attribute> 
  </Subject> 
 
  <Resource> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"> 
      <AttributeValue>12345</AttributeValue> 
    </Attribute> 
  </Resource> 
    
  <Action> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
      <AttributeValue>addMetadataToEntity</AttributeValue> 
    </Attribute> 
  </Action> 
</Request> 
 
Fig. 4 XACML request metadata attachments and third party 
annotation. A scenario that describes the 
motivating security requirements for such a 
registry is presented. We then briefly present 
XACML as an approach to implementing the 
access control engine for the engine towards 
fulfilling the required security requirements. A 
sample scenario illustrating how XACML 
policies and rules can be applied within the 
security infrastructure is described. We believe 
the approach of permitting users to specify 
security assertions pertaining to data owned by 
them represents a useful way forward towards 
articulating more flexible access control 
requirements domains involving large number 
of users with disparate security requirements. 
 
Future work in this area could look at 
examining more standard ways of providing 
security assertions as metadata attachments. In 
addition to arbitrary XML fragments or direct 
XACML rules, it might be interesting to 
examine the use of SAML assertions in line 
with the SAML-XACML mapping profile in the 
XACML standard. The XACML-RBAC 
mapping profile could be used as a guide 
towards implementing a more comprehensive 
form of role based access control to supplant the 
simple identity-to-group mapping implemented 
by the pre-processor in the security architecture.  
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